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ABSTRACT 
If one subscribes to the belief that doctrine is a common understanding of what 
fundamental principles guide an organization, then this thesis demonstrates that there is 
currently no common understanding of homeland security. There is currently a lack of 
institutional doctrine that can be applied nationally for state level government to develop 
their homeland security strategies. The military has a long history of successfully using 
doctrine to develop war-fighting strategy.  Comparisons can be made to the Air Force’s 
use of doctrine to gain autonomy as well as the effect joint doctrine has on achieving 
unity of effort across disciplines.  Additional lessons can be learned from past civil 
defense attempts at institutionalization and the evolution to emergency management and 
homeland security. By modeling of these existing, known, and accepted doctrines or lack 
thereof, a national homeland security doctrine could emerge. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
At the very heart of warfare lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs 
for waging war in order to achieve victory. Doctrine is of the mind, a 
network of faith and knowledge reinforced by experience which lays the 
pattern for the utilization of men, equipment, and tactics. It is the building 
material for strategy. It is fundamental to sound judgment [emphasis 
added]. 
General Curtis E. LeMay 
(Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 
2007) 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT—BACKGROUND 
Recent history has identified weaknesses in our nation’s ability to coordinate and 
collaborate across disciplines and jurisdictions, resulting in the revision of how we 
organize planning efforts across the nation. From this new organization, the concept of 
homeland security formed, requiring different leadership skills and tools in order to 
manage the ever-changing threat of terrorist activity toward the United States.  
In response, state government began to incorporate homeland security into their 
organizations.  Homeland security at the federal level provides several strategies but 
lacks institutional doctrine that can be applied nationally for state level government.  
Subsequently, state homeland security strategies and structures vary across the nation. 
For example, the revisions of the National Strategy for Homeland Security (Homeland 
Security Council, 2007) and the National Response Framework (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency [FEMA], 2008b) demonstrate that this growing field is continuing 
to develop. However, interpretations are oftentimes different within each state, 
consequently creating inconsistency throughout the nation in executing the intent of these 
policies. This inconsistency is troubling, as the responsibility for developing and 
executing homeland security strategies and missions will almost always fall to the state 
and local authorities. Furthermore, these misaligned strategies create tension in the 
collaboration efforts amongst state departments, clear lines of authority are often askew, 
and there is a failure to institutionalize homeland security within the state. A common 
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doctrine could link these efforts, advocating a common purpose or direction for the state, 
but such doctrine does not presently exist. The intent of such a doctrine is to provide a 
single national doctrinal from which states can develop individual strategy, not 
necessarily to develop independent doctrines for each state.  There is a need for a national 
consensus regarding the relevance of homeland security.  
Doctrine, as defined for this thesis, is a set of guiding principles that establish the 
foundation for the various strategies and policies of an organization.  Doctrine defines a 
system that accounts for competing agendas and priorities within their current missions, 
applying the lessons learned from history to achieve the fundamental principles for the 
state. The military application of doctrine is an example that clearly demonstrates this 
concept.   
Decades of military doctrine have provided fundamental principles to build the 
strategies and policies necessary in accomplishing military missions.  The success the 
military has had with this model demonstrates the validity and need for sound doctrinal 
documents and makes the military the leading example to follow in the development of 
future doctrine.  Current military doctrine applied in a global environment is set in 
motion through strategy development. States can take a proactive role and learn from the 
military model to define their homeland security doctrine. This is not to say that 
individual states are not successful in achieving their homeland security goals, but there 
is room for improvement and standardization. Homeland security at all levels is evolving; 
therefore, change is expected.  It is time to coalesce around the strengths of each of these 
programs, learn from the military model, and build sound, national doctrine that all can 
benefit from.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION(S) 
1. What should be included in a homeland security doctrine?    
2. How can the principles of military doctrine be applied to state homeland 
security programs from a national perspective?  
3. What already exists within homeland security at the state level nationally?  
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4. What are the fundamental pillars for good doctrine based on the military 
model?  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature supporting the concept of doctrine is extensive and broad.  
Definitions of doctrine expand across a broad range of disciplines.  A review of the 
literature surrounding doctrine in other disciplines offers some universal themes that 
could be applied to the homeland security lexicon. Religious and military doctrines have 
the most mature development, implementation, and support.  For example, religious 
doctrine, such as Catholicism, sets the foundation for more than one billion members.  
Presidential doctrine typically identifies the current president’s foreign policy goals. The 
first major presidential doctrine is considered that of James Monroe in 1823 (Martin, 
n.d.). There is also political doctrine, such as egalitarianism a “political doctrine that 
holds that all people should be treated as equals and have the same political, economic, 
social, and civil rights” (Egalitarian, n.d.).  Other examples of doctrine include legal 
doctrine or constitutional doctrine and the fairness doctrine (media), which advocated that 
the media demonstrate a fair and unbiased view of the news.  The significance of these 
examples is the strength of each entity gains surrounding their doctrinal beliefs.   
1. Defining Doctrine 
Military doctrine provides the most accepted model. Department of Defense Joint 
Publication 1 (JP-1) (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2007), defines doctrine as the 
fundamental principles and overarching guidance for joint wartime operations. The 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5120.02B (CJCSI 5120.02B) (JCS, 
2009) states that doctrine is perspective; “Joint doctrine represents what is taught, 
believed, and advocated as what is right (i.e., what works best).”  Air Force Basic 
Doctrine 1(AFBD-1) (United States Air Force [USAF], 2003) follows this thinking, 
stating that doctrine is a set of foundational statements that represent basic principles and 
beliefs in support of national objectives. Doctrine is an accumulation of knowledge that 
shapes how the Air Force organizes, trains, equips, and sustains its forces but used with 
good judgment. AFBD-1 further states, “military doctrine is authoritative, but unlike 
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policy, is not directive.” One final definition of doctrine is described in the Eionet (n.d.) 
thesaurus as “a policy, position or principle advocated, taught or put into effect 
concerning the acquisition and exercise of the power to govern or administrate in 
society.”  
These definitions do not come without some counter arguments. The Air Force 
states within its own principle doctrinal document that doctrine has a mixed reputation 
(USAF, 2008): “It frequently conjures mental images of dry, arcane, lofty discussion by 
distant academicians and theorists, of unproven theories and unfulfilled promises, of little 
apparent use to the average airman trying to do a job down at the unit level.” (USAF, 
2008). During a recent military briefing, one presenter described doctrine as a point of 
departure.  The following presenter disagreed, stating that we depart from doctrine too 
often and doctrine is our foundation that we should build upon (Coste & Groeninger,, 
2011).  In a Rand Corporation report, Long (2008) has an opposing view.  He argued 
“that a military organization’s structure, philosophy, and preferences (grouped under the 
general rubric of ‘organizational culture’) have a much greater influence on the conduct 
of operations than written doctrine” (Long, 2008). It further argues that the culture of 
military organizations does more to shape doctrine than doctrine does to shape 
operations. It could be argued, however, that an organizations culture is indeed their 
doctrinal beliefs. Regardless of the point of view one takes, doctrine provides a base or 
starting point, and without doctrine, plans are haphazard and inconsistent.  
Mintzberg (1994) supports this and implies that the failure of planning is the lack 
of a framework.  His differentiation between strategy and planning where strategy sets 
the foundation and planning adds capacity.  This could be applied to an interpretation of 
doctrine.  Doctrine sets the foundation and strategy adds the capacity. 
Before there can be a discussion, therefore, on how to develop homeland security 
doctrine for state governments, we must first discuss the relationship between policy, 
strategy, and doctrine.  The three terms are often used interchangeably but are 
fundamentally different.  Policy, strategy, and doctrine are integral to each other, but 
maintain different roles.  
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2. Doctrine and Strategy 
The difference between doctrine and strategy is often confused in the literature. 
Doctrine should provide foundational information on what to do, but not specify how. 
According to the USAF, “We must strive above all else to be doctrinally sound, not 
doctrinally bound” (USAF, 2008). Doctrine, therefore, provides guidance for action and 
the development of strategy. Strategy defines how to implement the objectives of 
doctrine. Joint and other military doctrine is the basis for development of national 
strategy. The USAF further states, “Strategy originates in policy and addresses broad 
objectives and the plans for achieving them” (USAF, 2008). Doctrine is a method to link 
the ends with the means and strategy defines how this is accomplished to support national 
strategic objectives.  Doctrine provides senior leaders the foundation of military core 
competencies, capabilities, and limitations that are included and detailed in the national 
security strategy (JCS, 2009).  It further states that the relationship between doctrine and 
strategy provides an opportunity for other stakeholders to gain a better understanding of 
the mission.  
Mintzberg (1994) provides a four-step process for strategic planning that begins 
with defining the culture of the organization; this is a component of doctrine.  The second 
step is organized around the culture in terms of managers, tasks and their key 
relationships; this is developing strategy to implement the doctrine. To relate his 
definition of strategy as doctrine further, he states that strategy should be fairly solid and 
be able to survive difficulty (Mintzberg).  He goes on to state, however, that strategy 
must also be able to adapt and is in fact more flexible than doctrine (Mitzenberg).  This 
author disagrees; doctrine is the foundation and therefore should not change so easily.   
That is not to say doctrine cannot change. If substantial environmental changes 
are occurring, then doctrine can adapt (Mintzberg, 1994).  Bryson (2004) disagrees with 
this and focuses heavily on the fact that public and non-profit organizations need to create 
a public value and in order to accomplish this; leaders and managers must be effective 
strategists.  He does follow Mintzberg in his differentiation between strategic thinking 
and strategic planning, but he does not dismiss strategic planning as easily (Bryson).  His 
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theme is repeated throughout his multiple step-by-step processes in that regardless if it is 
called strategic planning or strategic thinking, it is all about providing an architecture to 
enhance decision making that contributes to the public value (Bryson).  
Bryson (2004) makes some interesting comparisons as well between strategic 
planning and strategy that could also be inferred as doctrine and strategy.  In particular, 
his focus on vision and purpose and the three questions he repeats throughout his book, 
what the organization is, what it does, and why it does it are the components that should 
be included in doctrine to help guide the development of strategy (Bryson).  This has 
great bearing on homeland security because those three questions have not been answered 
and contribute to the ongoing conflicting interpretations of how to structure homeland 
security organizations.   
A final point is Mintzberg’s (1994) view of strategy is really doctrine.  He defines 
strategy as the broad outlines with the specific details left to be worked out in planning.  
The vision is sound and can withstand the unforeseen; this is doctrine.  Strategy creates 
the plan and adapts more easily to those surprises we are sure to face.  His best example 
of doctrine and is a great analogy for the current lack of homeland security doctrine is in 
this statement, “if you have no vision but only formal plans, then every unpredicted 
change in the environment makes you feel like your sky is falling” (Mintzberg, 1994). 
This is where the current state of homeland security sits.   
3. Doctrine and Policy 
The intent of policy is to provide direction as compared to doctrine that provides 
authoritative guidance.  The Air Force defines policy as “guidance that is directive or 
instructive, stating what is to be accomplished. Policies may change due to changes in 
national leadership, political considerations, or for fiscal reasons” (USAF, 2008). Joint 
doctrine defines policy as providing national strategic direction, “a broad course of action 
or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of 
national objectives” (JCS, 2007). 
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Doctrine should be long lasting and stable where policy can be adapted to reflect 
new views or priorities and is typically reflected in strategy or executive orders.  Policy, 
however, often determines doctrinal direction and development. This suggests the 
development of policy and doctrine should happen harmoniously to avoid conflict. 
According to CJCSI 5120.02B (JCS, 2009), “it is not always clear when a void is 
identified whether filling it will require new (or revised) doctrine or policy (or perhaps 
both). As a general rule, if the need can only be adequately addressed by using such 
prescriptive words as ‘shall’ and ‘must’ then the void is in policy and policy development 
should precede doctrine development.”  
Doctrine is not policy or strategy; rather it makes policy and strategy effective. It 
is intended to assist the disparate branches of the military operate successfully together, 
recognizing the different missions that each have and must uphold (JCS, 2007). 
4. Doctrine and Homeland Security 
In the developing field of homeland security, doctrine should provide a starting 
point for decision makers to shape its structure.  Rather than starting from a blank piece 
of paper, doctrine should outline basic principles, such as a common understanding of the 
mission, areas of responsibility and guidance into the future. The literature supporting 
doctrine for homeland security, however, is surprisingly lacking and complex at best. It is 
often comingled with strategy and fails to distinguish the difference clearly. This can be 
attributed to the perceived need to add the lexicon of homeland security into the planning 
process quickly to demonstrate progress towards a safer nation.  
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) attempts to provide tools to assist 
all levels of government in their efforts. The National Response Framework (NRF) 
(DHS, 2008b) provides guidance on how the nation will respond to a catastrophic event.  
The National Incident Management System (NIMS) (DHS, 2008a) complements this and 
provides a management structure that provides the capacity for all levels of government, 
along with non-governmental and private sector partners to work together towards a 
successful outcome. The National Preparedness Goal, released in 2007, uses the word 
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doctrine to describe its intent as a preparedness doctrine (FEMA).  Additionally, the 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101 (FEMA, 2010a) is suggested to be the 
best available planning doctrine and “provides guidelines for developing an [emergency 
operations plan] EOP and promotes a common understanding of the fundamentals of 
planning and decision making.” This supports the definitions discussed earlier that 
doctrine is based on fundamental beliefs and principals.  
To support this need for a national homeland security doctrine, recent studies 
have highlighted deficiencies in our current system and the importance that the state and 
local communities have in the overall homeland security effort.  It can be argued that 
these deficiencies, while not listed as doctrinal gaps, are a result of no common 
understanding or foundational platform from which to build.   
The Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) Report: A Strategic 
Framework for a Secure Homeland (DHS, 2010), emphasizes “homeland security 
professionals must have a clear sense of what it takes to achieve the overarching vision.”  
And that “no single entity is responsible for or directly manages all aspects of the 
enterprise” (DHS, 2010). The QHSR emphasizes the need for an enterprise. The 
enterprise focuses on bringing together the disparate parts of our government to achieve 
the homeland security vision effectively. However, for an effective homeland security 
enterprise to work, the players have to work from a common understanding.  If each state 
has a different set of understandings, how can we effectively achieve critical homeland 
security capabilities? This lack of understanding is highlighted in the report as well when 
it describes that homeland security “is built upon critical law enforcement functions, but 
is not about preventing all crimes…it is embedded in trade activities, but is neither trade 
nor economic policy. It requires international engagement, but is not responsible for 
foreign affairs” (DHS, 2010). This can be interpreted that homeland security is about 
ideals and the mission of these ideals is carried out by other agencies.  
The QHSR suggests assembling a more cohesive stakeholder community and 
must include those that execute the homeland security mission on a daily basis (DHS, 
2010). Coordination at this level has improved; however, findings in the QHSR (DHS, 
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2010) also suggest that the foundation of this community, emergency responders at the 
state and local level “do not necessarily think of themselves as homeland security 
stakeholders.”   
In 2009, a survey of homeland security advisors by the National Governors 
Association (NGA) identified several priorities.  The recurring theme in this survey, 
coordinating state and local efforts, seems to be indicative of the direction for the future 
(NGA, 2009). This theme is supported through recent revisions of some state homeland 
security strategies, aligning them into a broader governance structure. This is significant 
because the homeland security enterprise is far reaching. Responsibility to provide for the 
safety and security of our citizens is not bound to a particular level of government or 
discipline.  
The QHSR reflected the push towards increased collaboration as well. The QHSR 
(DHS, 2010) identified the need to increase stakeholder engagement as well as be 
responsive to stakeholder feedback in an effort to improve our collaboration efforts. This 
is represented in the process of conducting the QHSR itself, allowing for the first time 
input for a quadrennial review from a broader stakeholder community. A key concept 
identified is a life cycle model of stakeholder engagement. This “reflects not only DHS 
leadership’s vision, but also a policy and cultural shift in government decision making” 
(DHS, 2010). The Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano (2009) 
supports this direction, stating in response to the QHSR: 
We are a nation of more than 300 million. More than that, we’re a nation 
of families, communities, organizations, of cities, suburbs, tribes, all of 
their local governments and organizations. And, within these groupings 
lies an extraordinary pool of talent, ingenuity and strength. We face a 
networked enemy. We must meet it with a networked response. The job of 
securing our nation against the threat of terrorism is a large one, and it 
may never be totally completed, but we have a much larger chance at 
success if we strengthen our own networks by enlisting the talents and 
energies of Americans. 
In 2006 and again in 2010, DHS conducted a nationwide plan review.  The initial 
39 findings in the 2006 Nationwide Plan Review, Phase 1 and 2 Report (DHS and 
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Department of Transportation) were reduced to six major observations in the 2010 
Nationwide Plan Review, Fiscal Year 2010 Report to Congress (FEMA, 2010b).  These 
observations are: 
1. Catastrophic planning efforts were found to be unsystematic and uneven.  
2. Rapid homeland security mission expansion and the diversity of risks 
outpaced planning and planning actions had outstripped planning 
documentation.  
3. Planning processes were outmoded, current tools and guidance were 
rudimentary and planning expertise showed insufficiency for catastrophic 
incidents.  
4. Collaboration requirements were not well-defined, fostering a tendency to 
plan internally.  
5. The prevailing approach to planning emphasized general roles and 
responsibilities over detailed procedures for specific hazards, scenarios or 
thresholds of incidents.  
6. The feasibility of plans was dependent on resource inventories, databases 
and resource tracking mechanisms, all of which were areas of universal 
weakness (FEMA, 2010b) 
These six observations demonstrate the need for fundamental guidance that 
articulates the basic principles of homeland security—a homeland security doctrine.  
In a Heritage Foundation report (2005), Carafano, Rosenzweig, and Kochem’s 
believe that homeland security will be more successful if states and localities retake the 
responsibilities for making their jurisdictions more resilient, and remove the dependency 
on the federal government (i.e., FEMA).  They note that the number of federally declared 
disasters has tripled over the last 16 years, from 43 under President George H. W. Bush 
to 130 under President George W. Bush (Carafano, Rosenzweig, & Kochem, 2005).  The 
number of declarations under President Barack Obama far exceeded previous years with 
a total of 237 disasters including 96 major disasters, 28 emergency declarations and 113 
fire management assistance declarations (FEMA, n.d.). According to the Heritage 
Foundation report:  
There are two pernicious effects from this dependency: 1) states and 




federal government will bail them out. 2) FEMA becomes distracted by 
routine disasters instead of focusing their resources on truly national 
threats. (Carafoano et al., 2005) 
Kettl (2003) argues that none of the federal level strategic planning “will matter 
unless states and local governments are a strong and effective part of the plan.”  Without 
the support of state and local governments, the weakest link in the system can become a 
single point of failure.  According to Tierney, Lindell, and Perry (2001), 
state government has been described as the pivot in the intergovernmental 
system . . . in a position to determine the emergency management needs 
and capabilities of its political subdivisions and to channel State and 
Federal resources to local government. 
Kettl (2003) also supports the Heritage Foundation report, suggesting that the 
federal government has done little to help state and local governments increase their 
readiness.  Current federal policy does little more than to tell state and local governments 
to improve, but it does not provide “a clear message of what to look out for or where to 
be most ready” (Kettl). He identified that there are wide variations in the homeland 
security organizational structures between state and local governments, creating varying 
degrees of preparedness that doesn’t necessarily correlate to the level of threat (Kettl). 
Carafano et al. (2005) suggest, “state and local governments have a critical role to play in 
combating terrorism,” but there is role confusion between the priority of response and 
prevention.     
Kettl (2003) continues to argue that improving homeland security requires top-
down policy control, but that the top is the state. Kettl states, “It makes little sense to 
make this the federal government’s job, because the conditions in the states are too varied 
[and} local governments are creatures of the states.” Therefore, “states are in the ideal 
position to secure better coordination” (Kettl). Furthermore, Kettl believes “If there is to 
be better coordination, it will have to be secured by the states, within a nationwide plan.” 
Kettl’s argument however, is based in improving the current funding system, rather than 
improving the system itself.  This suggests the common understanding of homeland 
security is about money; therefore, should our doctrine focus on funding?  
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The debate surrounding homeland security funding is prevalent for many states. 
Kettl (2003) reports that in the four states studied, Pennsylvania, Texas, Wisconsin, and 
Washington, there was consensus that they do not have enough resources to meet the 
homeland security challenge.  What this challenge is, however, is not clear in this report.  
Kettle states that meeting these demands requires more money. What are the demands?  
Kettl argues against “putting more money into the system” that it “is not likely to close 
those gaps, unless the system fundamentally changes” (Kettl, 2003). This focus on 
funding is not based on what needs to happen in the future, says Kettl, and believes that 
“more of the same will not necessarily mean better homeland security.”  
In the Heritage Foundation report, Carafano et al. (2005) also focus on better 
ways to spend money in an effort to combat terrorism.  The report provides numerous 
examples of poor allocation of funding, but the report is limited in the discussion 
regarding better doctrine to base spending priorities on (Carafano et al.).  
In a separate Heritage Foundation (Romney, 2005) report, the reactive nature of 
government is characterized when, in response to the attacks of September 11, massive 
amounts of money were sent to states to increase preparedness of first responders without 
understanding where the deficiencies were.  This created excessive redundancy in 
capability in some communities and glaring gaps in others. Small towns and cities in 
close proximity to each other now had mobile command centers rather than developing a 
concept of collaboration and regionalization and maximizing the funding and sharing 
resources.  According to Romney, “We need those things, but it has not been on a 
spending strategy based on a completely layered view of how we can protect the 
homeland, and that’s something we have time to do now” ( 2005). When budgets enter 
the planning arena, it can impede strategic thinking.  When the focus shifts from a vision 
for the future and gets stuck on the status quo (Mintzberg, 1994).   
This is seen in the current process for homeland security grant funding.  The 
current grant process has driven our homeland security planning instead of planning 
driving the actual future needs.  Doctrine can be used to regain control of the decision- 
making process that was lost because of the “multiplicity of real decision centers” 
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(Mintzberg, 1994).  This again can be seen in current homeland security planning—with 
no real direction on where homeland security is heading—no central decision center—the 
remaining strategic process for homeland security varies throughout our nation—not in 
control. 
5. Homeland Security and State Government 
Much of the current literature on state homeland security efforts, ironically, 
focuses on strategies. The primary output for homeland security advisors is developing 
comprehensive homeland security strategies for each state.  These strategies largely 
center on implementing the target capability list and national planning scenarios and 
focus very little on what homeland security looks like for the state.  These approaches 
grew, in part, out of the rush to develop a strategy in time to apply for homeland security 
grant funding, rather than taking a systems approach, using doctrine to drive strategy 
development.    
Homeland security responsibilities have been pushed upon state governments, and 
according to Steiner (n.d.), “state governments have been assigned the lead role.”  This 
push for responsibility is illustrated by the immediate development of state homeland 
security strategies to direct their activities. Bryson’s (2004) most interesting point that 
supports this is the discussion surrounding state and local governments and their gain in 
power over the last 15  years.  He states, “In the first decade of the new century, the 
federal government is no longer the instrument of first resort when it comes to dealing 
with the most complex social and economic problems” (Bryson).  The lack of doctrine 
has left state and local governments as the primary problem solver with great uncertainty 
on how to achieve that.    
Mintzberg (1994) makes the statement that strategy is developed at the lower 
level but based on objectives made by top management. He describes this as “cascading 
down the structural hierarchy” to create an atmosphere of control (Mintzberg).  But the 
goal should be to motivate; therefore, objectives should be made at all levels and 
coordinated up to motivate the people that will be ultimately implementing the strategy.  
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This directly relates to the argument for developing a national doctrine for state 
government rather than continually trying to implement plans and strategies based on 
directives from the federal government. The actual work of homeland security is 
primarily achieved in the local community; therefore, the impetus for developing a 
homeland security architecture should not only include state and local partners but be 
driven by them.  
D. HYPOTHESES OR TENTATIVE SOLUTIONS 
A common national homeland security doctrine will provide guidance for how to 
structure the states around a homeland security mission, allowing the states to articulate 
clearly how they are to perform their mission and why it is important. This doctrine will 
allow states to coordinate efforts surrounding the multiple homeland security missions 
that currently need addressing.  
The military has successfully demonstrated the validity of doctrine, and states can 
take a proactive role and learn from the military model to define their homeland security 
doctrine.  There are additional lessons to be learned from civil defense and emergency 
management models.  Rather than create a new bureaucratic structure, which often times 
fails to recognize the interdependencies of existing disciplines, homeland security should 
expand upon existing doctrine.  While the threat has changed, the principle tenets are 
largely unchanged, and this current threat is a natural adaptation to existing doctrine 
providing the opportunity to maximize on existing fundamental principles.  
The future holds the potential for even greater threat with the continued use of 
terrorism around the world. A comprehensive, deliberate homeland security doctrine is 
necessary for states to be more effective, building and sustaining the necessary 
partnerships, establishing the parameters for those things needed in the overall homeland 
security mission.   
E. METHODOLOGY AND CHAPTER LAYOUT 
A modeling process is the primary methodology for this research.  This 
methodology was chosen on the basis that there is an existing model that provides clear 
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components in doctrinal development and implementation through strategy and policy. It 
also assumes that comparisons can be made from existing homeland security programs to 
identify best practices and provide a basis for which to begin.  
The first data point collection is existing doctrine from military models. The 
military model was chosen on the basis that military doctrine is believed to be the 
standard for doctrinal development.  This thesis will review all branches of the military as 
well as joint doctrine for the architecture and framework used to develop respective 
doctrines.  Chapter II provides a close examination of how the Air Force doctrinal 
development provides a road map for how it gained autonomy.  It will then review how 
joint military doctrine closely resembles homeland security and the necessity of 
incorporating multiple disciplines into a standard doctrinal document. Additionally, a 
review of components common among all military branches, their interdependencies, and 
their differences will illustrate the benefits of doctrine and provide a foundation for 
development of a national homeland security doctrine. The architecture and framework 
used to develop doctrine for the respective services, as well as joint doctrine, provide the 
shared key ingredients within the military process and modeling these recognized 
practices provide a starting point for an accepted homeland security doctrine. 
A second data point will consider existing emergency management models. 
Beginning with civil defense and the transition to emergency management, the parallels 
and differences provide the platform needed to start the conversation on the development 
of homeland security doctrine.  Chapter III will review the Federal Civil Defense Act of 
1950, subsequent iterations, and how states structured their organizations in response to 
this act.  An examination of emergency management models will also demonstrate that 
through national standards, state governments organized around a single standard and 
subsequently obtained accreditation to validate their programs.  Additionally, a brief 
review of existing federal doctrine will provide insight on the impact to state homeland 
security programs.  
The final data point is the identification of what governance structures are in place 
in state homeland security programs.  A review of previously published studies and 
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reports will identify variances and similarities across the country.  This will include an 
analysis of the perceived priorities that establish a starting point for the core capabilities 
of a homeland security doctrine.  It will also examine governance structures, the 
appointment of the homeland security advisor, the various disciplines that the position is 
assigned to, and the changes seen over the last decade.   
An inductive modeling process will identify observations from all data points, 
establish relationships between them, and identify potential gaps in existing state 
programs.  This evaluation will define the components of a homeland security doctrine 
that state governments can utilize to better protect, prevent, respond, and recover, thereby 
increasing the effectiveness of state homeland security programs.  
The findings will result in a proposed universal homeland security doctrine to be 
used by state governments. Understanding that there are variances amongst states, 
including risks, vulnerabilities, population, and existing resources, this doctrinal template 
will identify key processes and standard components that are essential for all states. From 
there, homeland security strategies can be developed to incorporate the unique needs for 




II. MILITARY MODEL 
Decades of military doctrine have provided fundamental principles to build the 
strategies and policies necessary in accomplishing military war-fighting missions.  The 
military has a proven methodology for doctrinal development that is implemented 
through strategy and policy and is arguably the most accepted model of doctrine. The 
evolution of Air Force doctrine, leading to eventual autonomy from the Army Air Corps, 
presents much resemblance to the current evolution of homeland security.  The 
similarities between the path that the Air Force took and the path currently underway for 
homeland security creates a possible road map for future doctrine development within the 
homeland security environment.  Operating in a joint military environment also offers 
some semblance to homeland security as it provides an architecture for working amongst 
diverse organizations. Homeland security can emulate joint doctrine in developing a 
homeland security doctrine. There are limitations, however, in that the military model is a 
narrow view.  To overcome this, the architecture and framework used to develop doctrine 
for the respective services, as well as joint doctrine, provide the shared key ingredients 
within the military process and the modeling of these recognized practices provide a 
starting point for an accepted homeland security doctrine. 
A. EVOLUTION OF AIR FORCE DOCTRINE 
The maturation of the United States Air Force (USAF) and the quest for 
legitimacy is an interesting parallel to the current state of homeland security. The 
evolution of the Air Force and its application of air power theory developed into sound 
doctrine provides the foundation for the Air Force today. The process of doctrinal 
development throughout this growth helped provide autonomy and validated the need for 
a distinct and separate Air Force.  There are lessons for homeland security in this 
historical perspective.   
Today’s Air Force had its roots as part of the Army Signal Corps in 1907.  From 
that time, the evolution to autonomy is a result of a developing doctrine through “the 
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establishment of the Army Air Service in 1920 and the Army Air corps in 1926” (USAF, 
n.d.) and the eventual independence in 1947. During this development, discussion, and 
debate began surrounding the foundational principles of their mission.  In 1928, “the Air 
Corps Tactical School commandant forwarded a paper to Washington DC titled, ‘The 
Doctrine of the Air Force’” (USAF, n.d.), declaring that the air force should always be in 
support of surface forces. This was not a shared understanding and created two 
competing schools of thought—independence or a part of the Army.   
Further Air Force doctrinal development resulted in 1935 with the creation of the 
General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force, a major Army command (USAF, n.d.). One of 
the key documents produced by GHQ Air Force and considered the first Air Force 
doctrine was Field Manual 100-20, Command and Employment of Airpower (War 
Department, 1943), considered by many to be the Army Air Force’s Declaration of 
Independence. Published in 1943, it provided many of the foundational principles still 
seen today in Air Force doctrine. FM 100-20 (War Department, 1943) laid the 
groundwork for key components of doctrine by identifying unifying concepts, 
organizational principles, and roles and responsibilities creating of land power and air 
power as equal but independent forces, leading to an independent Air Force in 1947. 
According to the Air  Force Air and Space Power Course, “Though perhaps changed 
within the context of new technologies, most of today’s fundamental doctrinal principles 
were in place by the time the US Air Force was created in 1947” (USAF, n.d.). 
Air Force doctrine had its moments of trial and error, however. While initially 
founded on sound fundamental principles, outside influences did not allow senior leaders 
to develop sound strategies based on their original guiding principles.  The Cold War 
years saw a shift from the Air Force’s strategic bombing principles to that of nuclear 
deterrence.  Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-2, released in 1953, was the first official doctrine 
published and upheld the original beliefs of strategic bombing (USAF). However, it was 
here that these founding principles began to fade and move toward nuclear deterrence. 
The overall superiority of the U. S. Air Force over the Soviets allowed leaders to abandon 
their founding beliefs and would become apparent in future conflicts (USAF, n.d.).  
19 
 
As the Air Force prepared to engage in the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, it had 
no practical doctrine to guide it in a conventional warfare environment; the focus was and 
remained one of nuclear warfare. Although the Air Force was slow to learn from its 
history, the Army took advantage of the lessons from both Korea and Vietnam and the 
first joint doctrine was on its way to being developed. Known as the AirLand Battle 
doctrine, the concept provided for the collaboration between the Air Force Tactical Air 
Command (TAC) and the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) (USAF, 
n.d.). This reunion of forces pushed the Air Force into a supporting role and AirLand 
battle doctrine became the Air Forces basic doctrine for conventional warfare.   
Joint operations saw their own difficulties during the early stages of development.  
In response, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 mandated the services to develop joint 
doctrine as their way forward. The Air Force provided a framework to support this joint 
doctrine with the introduction of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) 
and was incorporated into Joint Publication 3-01.2, Joint Doctrine for Theater 
Counterair Operations (JCS, 1986). The Air Force encountered their first real test of 
returning to their foundational principles during Operation Desert Storm and was further 
cemented during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, bringing the Air 
Force back to its foundational beliefs (USAF, n.d.). 
B. JOINT DOCTRINE 
It has been 25 years since the Goldwater Nichols Act (United States Congress, 
1986) pushed collaboration and reduction of institutional barriers.  Joint Publication 1 
(JP 1 or Joint Pub 1) (JCS, 2007) is the result of this act and the beginning of an evolution 
of doctrine development amongst the services.  Mandated through the Goldwater Nichols 
Act, JP 1 provides a framework for collaboration and learns from the lessons throughout 
military history. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell 
stated, “the contributions of air, land, sea, space and special operations forces [cannot be 
viewed] in isolation” (Powell, 1992). He recognized that each service brought unique 




of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution (Powell). These three 
concepts are the key principles introduced in JP 1 and embedded throughout all joint 
doctrine publications.   
How do these three principles interrelate?  Unity of effort is the understanding 
that integration of inter-organizational partners provides synergy and synchronization of 
operations, (JCS, 2011) a comprehensive approach described as unified action, 
emphasizing effectiveness and efficiency (JCS, 2009).  Figure 1 (JCS, 2009) 
demonstrates the unity of effort concept, bringing in partners from many different 
disciplines.  
 
Figure 1.   Unified Action (From JCS, 2009) 
Centralized planning is the overarching guidance, ensuring synchronization 
among the various partners.  Simplicity and clarity are critical in centralized planning; 
“complex or unclear command relationships or organization are counterproductive to 
developing synergy” (JCS, 2009). 
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Decentralized execution allows operational command and control to make the 
detailed decisions necessary for successful implementation. It recognizes that no single 
leader can control the “detailed actions of a large number of individuals” (JCS, 2009). 
Joint Publication 1 (JCS, 2009) clearly summarizes this interconnectedness: 
“Unity of effort over complex operations is made possible through decentralized 
execution of centralized, overarching plans.”  
Expanding on the three key principles, the purpose of joint doctrine is 
authoritative and not prescriptive.  The goal is to standardize terminology, establish 
relationships and define responsibilities—centralized planning. When relationships are 
understood—unity of effort—efforts can be focused on implementing strategic, 
operational and tactical plans to address the current threat environment—decentralized 
execution (JCS, 2009). 
History plays a significant role in the evolution of joint doctrine. The progression 
of Air Force doctrine to help attain autonomy is one example.  However, this also created 
additional complexities for operating in a joint environment. These challenges were not 
new, however, and can be traced back to “the nation states of ancient Greece that 
maintained both armies and navies faced the same challenges of joint coordination that 
General Grant and Admiral Porter addressed at the battle of Vicksburg” (JCS, 1997). 
Understanding and analyzing the coordination problems seen throughout history provides 
the framework for developing the foundational principles of joint doctrine today.  
In a letter from Admiral Mullen (JCS, 2009), the current revision of JP 1 not only 
provides the fundamental principles and guidance for employment of forces, but it also 
strengthens the capacity of other government agencies.  JP 1 is the link between doctrine 
and applicable strategies as well as recognizing the contribution of other government 
agencies.  Joint doctrine recognizes that each branch of service brings with it a unique 
and crucial role, recognizing that these are complementary capabilities, and effective 
integration provides the synergy needed for successful implementation.  Moreover, it 




interdependence is unique to the situation. Joint doctrine emphasizes, “The result is a 
complex interactive environment in which events are largely unpredictable and 
sometimes counterintuitive” (JCS, 2009). 
Reflecting on the definition of doctrine, a common understanding of the 
fundamental beliefs for an organization, doctrine then represents what is considered to be 
right as it relates to whom it is written for.  According to CJCSI 5120.02B (JCS, 2009), 
joint doctrine is written for those who: 
• Provide strategic direction to joint forces (the Chairman and combatant 
commanders) 
• Employ joint forces (combatant commanders, subordinate unified 
commanders, or joint task force (JTF) commanders) 
• Support or are supported by joint forces (combatant commands, subunified 
commands, JTFs, component commands, the Services, and combat 
support agencies (CSAs)) 
• Prepare forces for employment by combatant commander, subordinate 
unified commanders, and JTF commanders 
• Train and educate those who will conduct joint operations 
Therefore, joint doctrine is broad in nature, authoritative, and “serves as a 
foundation for the development of more specific joint guidance” (JCS, 2009).  In addition 
to the capstone publication, joint doctrine provides several more specific doctrinal 
documents, such as Joint Publication 3 (JCS, 2011).  JP 3 is structured around 12 broad 
principles, nine of which are historical and have been included since its inception, and 
three that have evolved out of experience.  
C. KEY COMPONENTS OF ALL MILITARY DOCTRINE 
With a better understanding of the origins of military doctrine, what then are the 
key components then that make up doctrine?  For the purposes of this research, there was 
only a review of each military branches’ capstone documents.  It is understood that there 





individual capstone document.  These sub documents may provide more detail than the 
capstone, but as it relates to homeland security, the key foundational elements are the 
basis for this modeling.  
Using Joint Publication 1 as the starting framework, it provided the most 
comprehensive doctrine, as would be expected.  JP 1 (JCS, 2009) has seven main 
chapters:  
1. Foundations,  
2. Doctrine Governing Unified Direction of Armed Forces,  
3. Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components,  
4. Doctrine for Joint Command and Control,  
5. Doctrine for Joint Commands,  
6. Multinational Operations and  
7. Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization and Nongovernmental 
Organization Coordination.   
Throughout these chapters, the themes that arise are fundamentals, organization, 
functions, roles and responsibilities, and relationships.  There are ties back to existing 
strategic documents, command and control, operations, and a recognition that joint efforts 
go beyond the services and into the national community of state, local, and non-
governmental organizations (NGO) partners as well as the international community.   
These fundamental components are translated across the different services and 
establish JP 1 as the overarching guide for others to draw from.  The Air Force begins by 
defining doctrine and describes the relationship between strategy and policy.  The 
foundation for the doctrinal document is in the identification of the Air Force’s principles 
and tenets, clearly articulating the roles, missions and functions of air and space, how the 
Air Force adapts for expeditionary missions, and defining the Air Force core 
competencies (USAF, 2003).  It concludes by linking the present to the future.  
Similar to Air Force doctrine, Navy doctrine begins by establishing core values 
and ethos but follows a shorter path. The foundation of Navy doctrine is how to organize 
and then how to operate (Department of the Navy, 2010).  Marine doctrine is much more 
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focused and deliberate. Marine doctrine is simply stated as a need to understand war, 
prepare for war, and conduct war (Department of the Navy, 1997). Army doctrine is 
comparable to the Marines with distinct focus on warfighting.  The Army expands some 
from the Marine perspective, however, and the Army first seeks to understand the 
historical perspective, applying this to the current environment, and expands the detail of 
its role and what the future may look like (Department of the Army, 2001). 
Coast Guard doctrine was also reviewed and has significance in tying the 
Department of Defense doctrine with the future of homeland security doctrine. It 
organizes around four main themes—roles and missions and the maritime guardian, a 
historical reflection, core values and ethos, and, finally, principles of operations (United 
States Coast Guard, 2009). 
In all, there are common themes and sub themes seen throughout.  Four 
fundamental pillars emerge from the capstone doctrinal documents reviewed: 1) 
foundation, 2) direction and guidance, 3) organizational architecture and 4) relationships.  
A fifth concept—the way forward—is also present but was not common among all 
capstone documents.  
The first fundamental pillar (foundation) identifies the guiding principles for all 
branches of the service.  Within the foundational pillar are four sub themes. First, 
understanding one’s history, who the organization is and where the organization comes 
from. This understanding provides the main initial focus from which to build upon and 
includes an understanding of the nature of war itself. Second, a service’s values and ethos 
further defines the branch of service and provides an overarching proclamation of the 
service’s priorities and why. Third, these values and ethos set the stage for the guiding 
principles that are delineated in all of the doctrine.  Understanding the relationship 
between doctrine and strategy, in particular, how it relates to overall national security 
environment, provides the final foundational pillar, tying the overall strategic 
environment to existing doctrine.    
The second pillar, direction and guidance, is where the key elements of unity of 
effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution are articulated.  Applying the 
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general principles of a command and control environment into a doctrinal document 
provides the opportunity to explain how these three elements are related and support each 
other in a synergistic manner.  This concept was primarily seen within Joint Publication 
1 but has some references in the others as well.  To truly understand the concept of unity 
of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution, role and responsibilities must 
be defined, and is the second theme in this pillar.   
The first two pillars set the stage for why we need doctrine and the third pillar 
puts this into action.  Organizational architecture is broken down into three sub themes: 
organization, core capabilities, and functions.  Doctrine provides the basis to structure 
organizational components based on the values of the organization, taking lessons from 
history, and applying to the current security environment.  These components can then 
assert what they contribute by identifying core capabilities. Within these core 
capabilities, actual functions are outlined as they contribute to the overarching guidance.  
These are not intended to be tactical in nature, rather a common understanding of what 
functions can be provided.  
The final pillar defines then how we work together in an interagency 
environment.  The ability to establish and understand how the relationships complement 
each other, how their interdependence is a critical component of the overall doctrine, 
exemplifies the theme that “Unity of effort over complex operations is made possible 
through decentralized execution of centralized, overarching plans” (JCS, 2009). 
Finally, doctrine is meant to guide our ability to develop and implement strategy.  
A fifth pillar that links the current doctrine to the future is missing from most capstone 
documents.  Doctrine will remain somewhat stable, and strategy will change.  Providing 
that understanding as a concluding pillar provides continuity for the future and our ability 
to continue to learn from our history.  
The military model does not come without some counter arguments. The Air 
Force states within its own principle doctrinal document that doctrine has a mixed 
reputation (USAF, 2003). According to the Air Force, doctrine “frequently conjures 
mental images of dry, arcane, lofty discussion by distant academicians and theorists, of 
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unproven theories and unfulfilled promises, of little apparent use to the average airman 
trying to do a job down at the unit level” (USAF).  
The Rand Corporation (Long, 2008) has an opposing view.  It argues that the 
culture of military organizations does more to shape doctrine than doctrine does to shape 
operations (Long). Nevertheless, doctrine provides a base or starting point, and without 
doctrine, plans are haphazard and inconsistent. Mintzberg (1994) supports this and 
implies that the failure of planning is the lack of a framework.   
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY  
1. Air Force Model 
Looking retrospectively at the evolution of the Air Force and how its application 
of theory developed into sound doctrine, it can be surmised that this development of 
doctrine provides the foundation for the Air Force today.  There are lessons for homeland 
security in this historical perspective.  As the Army Air Service was developing into the 
Army Air Corps, and eventually the United States Air Force, there was much discussion 
and debate regarding what the foundational principles of the Air Force was to be (USAF, 
n.d.).  Looking through the eyes of state government, this evolution, combined with a 
lack of understanding of the foundational principles of the organization, has generated the 
same type of discussion and debate. The evolution of the federal homeland security 
mission parallels the development of the Air Force, beginning as a civil defense mission, 
evolving into the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP), then the Office of Homeland 
Security, and finally, today’s configuration as the Department of Homeland Security. A 
key difference between Air Force and homeland security development is the evolution of 
homeland security has a more direct impact on other levels of government, where the 
evolution of the Air Force primarily separated different federal missions. Regardless, 
lessons can still be drawn from the history of the Air Force.  
The Air Force published the first doctrinal document 23 years after the 
establishment of the Army Air Service. After several iterations and four years later, the 
Air Force as we know it today was born. Contrast this with homeland security, and, 
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assuming one agrees that the office of civil defense was the beginning of homeland 
security, scores of years have passed since civil defense was established.  The failure of 
homeland security in this scenario was the lack of adherence to foundational doctrinal 
principles to help it grow.  Rather, drastic changes have occurred through this 
evolutionary process rather than a systematic growth to provide a foundation for self-
sufficiency.  The value of using sound doctrinal principles to grow the organization, as 
seen in the Air Force model, lies in the ability to provide a better understanding of the 
guiding principles that form the conceptual basis for an inclusive, predictable, homeland 
security theory. 
As the Air Force grew through its doctrinal development, its guiding principles 
shifted, but eventually returned to its beginnings. This parallels the growth of homeland 
security beginning with civil defense and a focus on deterrence, as the Office of 
Domestic Preparedness (ODP) developed, the focus began to include response, and in 
today’s homeland security architecture the primary emphasis returns to prevention.  
Perhaps if we expand on past principles and return to founding principles, rather than try 
to create new ones, we would have better success at defining what the homeland security 
doctrine should look like.  
2. Joint Doctrine Model 
The Air Force model provided a map of how to grow through doctrinal 
development.  Joint doctrine provides a model to bring different disciplines together to 
reach a common objective. Each branch of the service has a capstone document that 
articulates the history, values, and overarching beliefs of their individual organizations. 
Joint doctrine attempts to coalesce these independent views and create a level of 
interdependency that provides the foundation for achieving even greater things. Finding 
the appropriate level of interdependence is vitally important in the development of an 
effective joint doctrine (USAF, 2003).  
The parallel to homeland security is notable.  The homeland security architecture 
at the state level is comprised of many different disciplines and levels of government.  
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States must work downward to include local jurisdictions, which, in and of themselves, 
have a variety of disciplines to integrate.  They must also work upward to comply with 
federal guidance and directives.  Finding the appropriate level of inclusion is vitally 
important to the development of state level homeland security doctrine. If direction is too 
abstract, it “ceases to function as an effective guide for” integration.  “if it is too concrete, 
it becomes prescriptive—valuable only within a narrow set of circumstances” (JCS, 
2009). 
This leads us to the three guiding principles of joint doctrine—unity of effort, 
centralized planning, and decentralized execution.  Applying these principles to state 
homeland security, unity of effort provides the platform for integration of inter-
organizational partners to provide the necessary synergy—a synchronization of 
operations. Unity of effort at the state level must find the balance between being too 
abstract and too concrete—recognizing the uniqueness each service brings to the mission, 
embracing their strengths and developing the program to integrate into the coordinated 
effort needed to be successful (JCS, 2009).   
The lessons of centralized planning and decentralized execution from joint 
military doctrine have direct implications to state homeland security.  Centralized 
planning provides the platform to incorporate a regional concept of planning.  This level 
of centralized planning creates opportunity to maximize the strengths and accommodate 
the weaknesses of those jurisdictions the state is there to support.  Decentralized 
execution then reinforces the concept that all disasters are local.  Execution will and must 
happen at the local level—with support from the state and federal level as needed. 
Decentralized execution allows operational command and control to make the detailed 
decisions necessary for successful implementation.  JP 1 (JCS, 2009) recognizes that no 
single leader can control the “detailed actions of a large number of individuals.” The 
QHSR (DHS, 2010) also emphasizes “no single entity is responsible for or directly 
manages all aspects of the enterprise.” This recognition describes the operation between 
the state and locals.  Centralized planning coordinated by the state, allows the locals to 
maximize their resources but remain in control of the command needed on the ground.  
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The relationships between the state and local jurisdictions are inhibited by the 
boundaries created from lack of doctrine.  Admiral Mullen (JCS, 2007) states that joint 
doctrine should strengthen other government agencies, recognizing the unique 
contributions each brings to the table. The QHSR (DHS, 2010) equally stresses this 
stating “homeland security professionals must have a clear sense of what it takes to 
achieve the overarching vision.”  Doctrine accomplishes this.  The uniqueness that 
homeland security offers is the ability to join disparate disciplines into a cohesive effort 
towards a more secure nation.  However, the lack of a common understanding of what 
that effort should entail creates tension, competition, and is inefficient.  Joint doctrine has 
proven principles to remove these boundaries and promote a more advantageous 
relationship. Joint doctrine’s success is the recognition of the interdependencies of 
working in a multi-disciplinary environment.  State homeland security programs must 
also embrace these interdependencies in an effort to grow and be sustainable.  
As stated in CJCSI 5120.02B (JCS, 2009), joint doctrine is written for those that 
provide strategic direction, employ joint forces, support, or are supported by joint forces, 
prepare forces and train and educate those who will conduct joint operations.  This 
directly relates to state homeland security programs.  Governors and homeland security 
directors provide strategic direction to their departments and to the local governments 
that they support.  States may not directly employ forces, or in a very limited fashion if 
they do, but they certainly make use of resources, such as the National Guard and fusion 
centers.  State governments support local governments directly, which are made up of 
many disciplines.  State homeland security offices facilitate preparation for employment 
through capability assessments and distribution of grant funding.  Finally, state homeland 
security offices provide the necessary training and education to their departments and 
local governments as relates to the homeland security mission.  Homeland security 




3. Key Components of Military Doctrine 
The four fundamental pillars, identified within the capstone documents of each 
branch of the military, provide a starting framework for the development of a homeland 
security doctrine.  The first pillar, foundation, creates an opportunity to understand the 
history and evolution of homeland security at the state level. As identified throughout 
military doctrine, understanding where one comes from offers a focal point upon which 
to build on.  Rather than create something entirely knew, doctrine is a platform from 
which to grow.  Values and culture are a critical component to consider in this pillar from 
a homeland security perspective.  Homeland security doctrine will need to encompass the 
values and cultures from various disciplines and integrate them into a synchronous 
overarching framework.    
Direction and guidance is the second pillar that stresses the importance of unity of 
effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution.  This understanding and 
acceptance of this concept is critical for homeland security doctrine to be beneficial.  
Joint doctrine has had its trial and errors.  Therefore, the lessons that joint doctrine 
provide should not be taken lightly. 
The third pillar, organizational architecture will define the organizational 
architecture that homeland security provides.  Doctrine articulates the best ways to 
organize around the functions and core capabilities of homeland security. As seen in joint 
doctrine, it outlines how each agency contributes to the overall architecture.  This is not 
tactical in nature, rather a common understanding of what capabilities can be provided. 
Eliminating the confusion behind this concept is vital to the discussion. 
Homeland security is a complex, intertwined web of capacities.  The third pillar 
sets forth those capacities and the fourth pillar establishes relationships and how they 
complement each other. The many complex, and sometimes contentious, issues involved 
in understanding homeland security relationships and responsibilities are clearly defined.  
Interagency coordination and integration embraces the unique and complementary 
capabilities brought to the homeland security architecture and begins with articulating 




The success the military has with this model demonstrates the validity and need 
for sound doctrinal documents and makes it the leading example to follow in the 
development of future doctrine.  Current military doctrine, applied in a global 
environment, is set in motion through strategy development. States can take a proactive 
role and learn from the military model to define their homeland security doctrine. This is 
not to say that individual states are not successful in achieving their homeland security 
goals, but there is room for improvement and standardization. Homeland security at all 
levels is evolving; therefore, change is expected.  It is time to coalesce around the 
strengths of each of these programs, learn from the military model, and build sound, 
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III. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT MODELS 
One argument against the development of a national homeland security doctrine 
for state government lies in the basis of federalism, separating responsibilities between 
the levels of government.  Development of a doctrine for state governments to embrace 
leaves an impression of a federal mandate, creating a level of tension and sensitivity 
across the nation and an impingement on the implied responsibilities that states already 
have.  Homeland security is a national issue and state governance has a responsibility to 
its constituents to meet the homeland security challenge (Homeland Security Institute 
[HSI], 2007).  The premise of this thesis, therefore, is not development of a federal 
doctrine or mandate, rather a national doctrine developed and agreed upon by state level 
government, empowering state governments to adopt standards that best represent their 
citizens (HSI, 2007). 
The progression of civil defense to emergency management reflects that applying 
a national doctrine is not an unfamiliar concept.  To the contrary, it demonstrates that 
states have been coalescing around national guidance and recommendations to organize 
and plan for several decades.  Through these efforts, a common understanding and 
organizational structures formed.  Many of these documents, however, did not set 
foundational doctrinal principles.  Nevertheless, they demonstrate that it is possible for 
state government, when approached through a collaborative effort, can unite around a 
common understanding of homeland security.  
This chapter will review the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, subsequent 
iterations, and how states have structured their organizations in response to this act. An 
examination of emergency management models will also demonstrate that through 
national standards, state governments organized around a single standard and 
subsequently obtained accreditation to validate their programs.  Additionally, a brief 
review of existing federal doctrine will provide insight on the impact to state homeland 
security programs.  
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A. CIVIL DEFENSE MODEL 
The Federal Civil Defense Act (FCDA) of 1950 offered an initial structure that 
evolved from the Office of Civil Defense in 1941 to the Office of Defense Mobilization. 
During the next 30 years, 11 different offices had the responsibility for carrying out the 
components of the FCDA, concluding with the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) in 1979 (City of Fort Collins, n.d.).1 The intent of this act provided a plan for 
the protection of life and property for the citizens of the United States and, in the words 
of President Harry S. Truman, “affords the basic framework for preparations to minimize 
the effects of an attack on our civilian population, and to deal with the immediate 
emergency conditions which such an attack would create” (Cohen & Boyer, 1951).  As 
titled, this act was federal in nature and implied mandates that would be carried out by 
state and local governments, most of which revolved around nuclear attack.  President 
Harry S. Truman reinforced this stating:  
It is further declared to be the policy and intent of Congress that this 
responsibility for civil defense shall be vested primarily in the several 
States and their political subdivisions. The Federal Government shall 
provide necessary coordination and guidance; shall be responsible for the 
operations of the FCDA as set forth in this Act; and shall provide 
necessary assistance as hereinafter authorized. (Cohen and Boyer, 1951)  
                                                 
1 In the article “Civil Defense to Emergency Management,” the author identifies the following list as 
the major agencies to have responsibility for civil defense from the inception of the Office of Civilian 
Defense to FEMA.   
1941: Office of Civilian Defense  
1947: National Security Resources Board (National Security Act of 1947)  
1949: National Security Resources Board, EOP (Executive Office of the President)  
1950: Office of Defense Mobilization, (Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950)  
1950: Federal Civil Defense Administration, OEM, EOP  
1951: Federal Civil Defense Administration  
1951: Defense Production Administration  
1958: Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization, EOP  
1958: Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, EOP  
1961: Office of Civil Defense, DoD (Department of Defense)  
1961: Office of Emergency Planning  
1964: Office of Civil Defense, DoA (Department of the Army)  
1968: Office of Emergency Preparedness, EOP  
1972: Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, DoD  
1979: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)   
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Pushing the responsibility for civil defense away from the federal level and to the 
states was recognized years later in a report to the Secretary of Defense, written by 
Russell J. Hopley (1948).  Hopley’s (1948) stance was that “America definitely has a 
‘missing link’ in its defense structure. Our country has, and is developing, various 
elements of our defenses to insure national security, but it has no national civil defense.” 
He went on to state that “basic operational responsibility to be placed in States and 
communities, but with mutual assistance plans and mobile supporting facilities for aid in 
emergencies” (Hopley). 
Despite the impression of an implied federal mandate, states around the country 
implemented basic tenets of this act, which became the foundational principles of civil 
defense for state and local government.  States achieved agreement on fundamental 
principles for the development of a civil defense program and organizational structure 
(Hopley, 1948). Interestingly, the first basic principle is also part of the implied mandate, 
giving the primary operating responsibility for civil defense to state and local 
governments.  “[t]hey must be the directing force in the protection of their own citizens” 
(Hopley, 1948). 
To aid this implementation, the Office of Civil Defense Planning proposed the 
development of a model State Civil Defense Act that could be included in any state civil 
defense legislation and would provide a model for states to organize and implement a 
civil defense program (Hopley, 1948).  The proposed model was not intended to be 
prescriptive or all-inclusive.  It would provide a platform from which states could build, 
incorporating their unique hazards and conditions they faced.  Hopley (1948) provided 







Figure 2.   Suggested Model for State Organization of Civil Defense (From Hopley, 1948) 
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The manner in which Hopley’s model created a platform for state organization 
influenced current state structures for homeland security.  Dimensions of this theory have 
promulgated homeland security throughout the nation.   
B. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT MODELS 
The Federal Civil Defense Act (1950), with the subsequent iterations of an office 
of civil defense, attempted to create a national model for states to follow.  As 
demonstrated above, this model acknowledges that state governments are willing to 
organize around a national model, making necessary adjustments to meet the specific 
needs of their state.  Likewise, several emergency management models suggest that states 
are also disposed to develop plans and procedures based on national and federal 
guidance.  Beginning with State and Local Guide (SLG) 101, Guide for All-Hazard 
Emergency Operations Planning released in 1996 by the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), emergency managers across the nation developed 
operational plans that addressed the threats of their respective states by following 
fundamental principles that were agreed to be part of an emergency operations plan.  This 
was not designed to be a template but an overarching document that stressed the 
fundamental principles of emergency management—mitigation, preparedness, response, 
and recovery (FEMA, 1996). The result was more of a template that many states have 
used to write their emergency operations plan.  
The current version of this guidance is the Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 
(CPG) 101 (FEMA, 2010a).  CPG101 “promotes a common understanding of the 
fundamentals of risk-informed planning and decision making to help planners examine a 
hazard or threat and produce integrated, coordinated, and synchronized plans” (FEMA, 
2010a).  The goal of CPG101 is the integration of other national preparedness doctrine 
into the states planning process to establish a framework for roles and responsibilities as 





(FEMA, 2010a).  According to FEMA, it shapes how a community envisions and shares 
a desired outcome, selects effective ways to achieve it, and communicates expected 
results” (2010a). 
A third emergency management model is National Fire Protection Association 
(NFPA) 1600, Recommended Practice for Disaster Management, as titled in 1995.  
Throughout its evolution, the scope and purpose remained consistent, the establishment 
of a common set of criteria as relates to disaster management. Much of the standard is 
reference and background; however, chapter five delineates the primary elements that 
should be included in an emergency management program.  Compare these elements with 
how states organize their emergency management programs, and one will find they are 
almost identical.   
Organization of the current standard (NFPA, 2010) revolves around five tenets: 
prevention, mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery. Comparing this to CPG101, 
the added tenet of prevention is a testament to the addition of homeland security in the 
lexicon of homeland security.  NFPA 1600 recognizes and articulates that the disaster 
community utilizing this standard is comprised from many different entities, with varied 
responsibilities and capabilities.  Furthermore, NFPA is governed by the American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI), which states, “The U.S. favors a decentralized 
approach, which means no central government agency is responsible for oversight of the 
entire system” (ANSI, 2008).  
The influence that this standard has had on the emergency management 
community is noteworthy. Not only have states organized their governmental structures 
around the precepts in NFPA 1600, some states have sought validation of their structures 
through accreditation.  The Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) 
provides a process for states and local jurisdictions to formally accredit their emergency 
management programs.  Through accreditation, states have the ability to authenticate 
their emergency management and homeland security programs by applying standards 
developed from a peer review process. EMAP is structured around NFPA 1600, as the 
agreed upon national standard for emergency management officials (EMAP, 2009). 
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C. NATIONAL MODELS  
The three models above demonstrate the willingness of state level government to 
coalesce around national models to aid in planning and organizing emergency 
management programs and development of operational plans.  These examples are 
operational in nature and not doctrinal, though.  Nevertheless, they clearly negate the 
argument that state level government would not embrace a national homeland security 
doctrine.  Additionally, there are federal guidance examples of what many consider to be 
federal mandates that states have also embraced and incorporated into their programs.  
The National Incident Management System (NIMS) (DHS, 2008a) is the primary 
federal guidance that can be seen throughout the nation, at all levels of government, as 
well as the private sector, non-governmental organizations, and voluntary organizations.  
With this document, DHS attempts to “provide[s] a consistent framework for incident 
management, regardless of the cause, size, or complexity of the incident” (DHS, 2008a). 
NIMS has adapted over time, moving from a military model to a fire model to the current 
all hazards model.  The intent is to “provide the Nation’s first responders and authorities 
with the same foundation for effective incident management of all hazards” (DHS, 
2008a). With each iteration, states have adapted their programs to incorporate the 
fundamental principles in NIMS.  Much of this compliance can be traced to the ability to 
obtain grant funding.  Nevertheless, the overall impact of NIMS created a more 
consistent model around the nation, allowing for better sharing of resources and overall 
incident management.   
A second federal guidance document to look at is the National Response 
Framework (NRF) (DHS, 2008b). The NRF sets out the roles and responsibilities of the 
different levels of government and the departments within them.  The NRF also 
incorporates the concepts of NIMS for how to organize during response.  The primary 
output of the NRF is a more coordinated response between all levels of government 
through consistent and collaborative planning (DHS, 2008b).  States and local 
jurisdictions embraced the NRF, and many have used this guidance to develop 
operational plans.  CPG101 (FEMA, 2010a) also recognized the impact of the NRF and 
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provided this as an option to develop operational plans.  An important element to take 
note of is that the NRF is also intended to guide prevention and protection planning.  It 
begins to expand the definition of emergency management and bring into the picture the 
elements of prevention—the key factor added since the birth of homeland security.  
D. INFLUENCE FROM NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
The need for a national doctrine and the willingness of states to accept this 
doctrine is reinforced by national emergency management organizations.  The National 
Emergency Management Association (NEMA) is an association of state emergency 
management directors and professionals whose vision and mission is to advance all-
hazards emergency management and “develop partnerships and initiatives necessary to 
improve the nation’s capabilities to protect the public through prevention, mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery from all emergencies, disasters, and threats to our 
homeland” (NEMA, 2010). 
Established in 1974, NEMA’s roots trace back to a need for state emergency 
management officials to unite on common emergency management issues. Goals in 
NEMA’s current strategic plan (2010) include defining the current system, establishing a 
baseline, and creating a national systems design.  Additionally, NEMA wants to “ensure 
state and local influence on emergency management and homeland security issues, 
programs, policies and advocate the early involvement of states into the development of 
national planning and guidance documents developed by the federal government” 
(NEMA, 2010).   
The National Homeland Security Council (NHSC) is a coordinating element with 
NEMA.  The vision and mission of NHSC is to enhance homeland security through 
prevention, preparation, response, and recovery from disasters and catastrophes and 
promote national policies that “preserve the public health, safety and security of the 
nation” (NHSC n.d. a). In a report from NHSC (n.d.), “current national efforts are not 
cohesive or comprehensive” and continue to evolve. Protecting Americans in the 21st 
Century summarized (NHSC, n.d. b):  
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[t]he sheer volume of major simultaneous initiatives along with the 
continuing crisis environment, fueled by reality and political discourse, 
combine to create unintended turmoil.  This turmoil inhibits our national 
ability to implement candid overarching assessments of the success or 
failure of specific programs and to effectively define a broader national 
approach.  National efforts remain a series of independent steps instead of 
a united comprehensive effort-one fully informed by all relevant 
stakeholders.  
NEMA is not the only national organization that supports national guidance and 
standards, as well as searching for a national homeland security doctrinal model.  The 
International Association of Emergency Management (IAEM) has also communicated 
similar concerns.  After decades of references to the principles of emergency 
management, the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Emergency 
Management Institute (EMI) assembled emergency management professionals to identify 
and agree upon what the principles of emergency management are (Principles, 2007).  
The outcome provided eight principles that would be used to guide the development of an 
emergency management doctrine (IAEM, n.d.). As a result, FEMA published its first 
doctrinal document in 2010, FEMA Publication 1 (Pub 1), which reiterates these 
principles.  Craig Fugate emphasizes the significance of Pub 1 in his opening letter:  
I am proud to introduce the first edition of FEMA’s Publication 1 (Pub 1), 
which serves as our capstone doctrine. Pub 1 communicates who and what 
FEMA is, what we do, and how we can better accomplish our missions. 
Pub 1 defines our principles and culture, and describes our history, 
mission, purpose, and ethos. The values and principles outlined in Pub 1 
are fundamental to FEMA, and all future FEMA guidance will be based 
on and consistent with FEMA’s capstone doctrine. Pub 1 will serve as a 
basis for the development or update of all other FEMA policies and 
processes, as well as any mission- or discipline-specific doctrine. (FEMA, 
2010c) 
The recent release of Pub 1 has become a framework for FEMA to develop the 
culture of emergency management.  Thirty-one years in the making, it provides a model 
for states to develop the framework of homeland security and the growing recognition of 
the value doctrine provides an organization. FEMA continues to provide guidance 
through doctrine with the recent release of several follow on doctrinal documents in 2011 
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including the National Disaster Recovery Framework (2011c), the Incident Management 
Handbook (2011a), and A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management: 
Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action (2010b). 
E. IMPLICATIONS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY  
Firmly rooted in American history, the legacy of the Civil Defense Act is a 
natural transition for homeland security.  Organized around the threat of a nuclear attack, 
the principle tenet from the Federal Civil Defense Act (FCDA) “affords the basic 
framework for preparations to minimize the effects of an attack on our civilian population 
and to deal with the immediate emergency conditions which such an attack would create” 
(Cohen & Boyer, 1951).  While the threat has changed, the principle tenets are largely 
unchanged.  In development of a homeland security doctrine, the template already exists 
and perhaps should be given more credence. Doctrine can change, and the current threat 
environment is one reason.  The continuing shift in doctrinal thinking revolves around the 
reactive nature of our society.  The recognition that the current threat is a natural 
adaptation to existing doctrine provides the opportunity to maximize on existing 
fundamental principles.   
The United Kingdom (UK) demonstrates this growth.  The UK does not have an 
independent government department for homeland security. Rather, it has been using a 
model since its interactions with the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) (UK 
Resilience, n.d.). Following the attacks on New York and Washington D.C. on September 
11, 2001, the government of London established a partnership to assess its capacity to 
respond to a similar event, London Resilience.  From the lessons learned, a new form of 
collaborative planning was born.  The most significant accomplishment was expanding 
on existing organizational structures to enhance overall resiliency (London Prepared, 
n.d.).  This was mandated in the Civil Contingencies Act and provided the means to build 
a more inclusive collaborative model. With support of the Civil Contingencies 
Secretariate, the London Resilience Partnership developed. Engagement of stakeholders 
occurs at all levels, integrating subject matter experts into the partnership, following the 
principles identified in military doctrine of unity of effort, centralized planning, and 
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decentralized execution.  The purpose of the partnership is to increase the coordination 
amongst these agencies, allowing their joint efforts to increase their effectiveness, 
therefore, creating a more resilient London.  The outcome is a formalized governance 
structure that provides a framework for regional local authority emergency planning and 
response. This organizational structure allows the local level to become the fundamental 
means for ensuring multiagency collaboration and bridges the gap in the overarching 
policy development and implementation.  
Former Cabinet minister, David Blulnkett, affirmed that by simply expanding the 
current resilience structures, they would be able to engage a larger stakeholder 
community and avoid the need for a huge new bureaucracy (Linde, O’Brien, Lindstrom, 
Spiegeleire, Vayrynen, & de Vries, 2002). By incorporating a bottom up approach, the 
UK resilience structures have been able to create clearer job responsibilities and identify 
how they fit into the overall picture.  
Emergency management models discussed reflect a similar adaptation as the UK 
model.  U.S. civil defense models continued to grow and adapt throughout their many 
iterations until the birth of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.  The capacity 
for state level governments to also grow and adapt their models in accordance with the 
national models reflects the basic fundamental belief that states are not only willing, but 
also seeking a national doctrine from which, to organize.   
The SLG 101 and CPG 101 substantiate this theory. State emergency 
management departments have used this guidance as the principle foundation from which 
to plan.  As the SLG moved to the CPG, state planning documents were adapted and new 
ones created in an effort to assimilate to a nationally accepted way of planning. Because 
these guidance documents are designed around emergency management, the concepts of 
homeland security are haphazardly incorporated. The absence of a similar homeland 
security guidance document will cause continued conflict between state agencies on the 
best way to implement programs to meet the current threats we face.   
National emergency management organizations have incorporated homeland 
security into their philosophies, but also they struggle to define the identity they want in 
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relation to this new environment.  The obvious disconnection between the federal 
structure and national structure is disturbing. Within the Department of Homeland 
Security, the federal structure to execute the homeland security mission; emergency 
management is a subordinate component.  Conversely, the two recognized national 
organizations that represent state government, NEMA and International Association of 
Emergency Management (IAEM), homeland security is the subordinate component, 
primarily as working groups.  This disconnection in the homeland security paradigm 
creates the tension that occurs when trying to develop homeland security doctrine, either 
at the federal or national level.  
F. CONCLUSION 
Rather than expand upon existing doctrine, a new bureaucratic structure 
developed, causing a divide and failing to recognize the interdependencies of existing 
disciplines to confront the new threat. There are many lessons to be taken from these 
models.  However, development of a new model will not be successful unless the key 
leaders from state government and national organizations embrace these lessons and 
direct their attention and efforts to the development of new doctrine.  As homeland 
security continues to grow and develop, better clarity will be obtained through 






IV. STATE HOMELAND SECURITY GOVERNANCE 
In the case of state governments, homeland security strategy exists, but it has not 
been institutionalized.  For example, a report from the National Governors Association 
(NGA), the Governors Guide to Homeland Security (Governors Guide) (NGA, 2007 & 
2010) delivers an attempt to create what could be considered a doctrinal model.  The 
Guide (NGA, 2010) is organized around the same principle tenets found in NFPA 1600 
(2010) and CPG 101 (FEMA, 2010) of prepare, prevent, respond, and recover.  Where 
this document falls short in relation to doctrine, however, is it fails to demonstrate what 
the fundamental principles of homeland security are as it relates to state level 
government.  Rather, it is a compilation of best practices for states to develop their 
independent structures.  It asks the following questions of governors: 
• How are the state’s homeland security functions and emergency 
management agencies [sic] coordinated? 
• What is the role and authority of the governor’s homeland security 
advisor? 
• Are state emergency response plans adequate to respond to the current 
threat environment? 
• How is the state’s fusion center organized, and what intelligence products 
does it produce? 
• Are the state’s first responders’ communications sufficiently 
interoperable? (NGA, 2010) 
These questions are left for states to interpret, rather than providing the starting 
point for a national doctrine from which states can develop their strategies. In relation to 
doctrine development, the Governors Guide (NGA, 2010) recognizes that inconsistencies 
currently exist in state governance and reinforces the findings from the NHSC (n.d.) that 
there is a lack of cohesiveness and comprehension of the homeland security architecture 
seen throughout the nation.  
The Council of State Governments (CSG) has also demonstrated a need for 
doctrine. In the State Officials Guide to Homeland Security (State Officials Guide) 
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(2002), the CSG recognizes that governors face many difficult questions when 
implementing homeland security programs.  These questions include: 
• What does an effective state homeland security strategy look like?  
• Where do homeland security directors sit in the upper levels of state 
government?  
• What are the top priorities of the men and women charged with protecting 
state citizens from terrorism and other disasters? 
• How do these state homeland security directors interact with their federal, 
local, and tribal partners? (Council of State Governments [CSG], 2002) 
The State Officials Guide  is offered as a tool to help answer these questions and 
identify what role the state has in homeland security, formulate what the critical issues 
are surrounding homeland security, and “rather than prescribing policy, the Guide 
provides balanced information, enabling states officials to determine the answers best 
suited to their state’s circumstances” (CSG, 2002).  
State governments respond in a similar manner to the federal government, in the 
reactive nature of their response to catastrophic events.  Responses can be media driven 
and quickly assume that a change in governance will correct the situation.  Doctrine can 
help work through these impulse reactions and guide states in taking a longer term 
view—one that will outlast the administration.  
A. STATE HOMELAND SECURITY PRIORITIES 
The CSG and the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) 
conducted a survey in 2002 to help answer the question, “What are the states’ roles in the 
war on terrorism” (CSG, 2002)? The initial findings identified four fundamental elements 
of homeland security: first responders, public health, infrastructure security, and 
intelligence gathering and investigation (CSG). The survey also identified other lessor 
priorities such as “border security, driver’s licenses and identification cards, mutual aid 
networks, volunteers and donations and public notification.” 
The National Governors Association published four subsequent surveys that 
revealed little change in these fundamentals.  The top priorities in 2006 included the same 
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concerns for first responders, public health, infrastructure protection, and intelligence 
(NGA, 2006). These priorities have remained stable for several survey years (see Figure 
3). 
 
Figure 3.   Top Homeland Security Priorities 2006 (From NGA, 2006) 
Strengthening citizen preparedness was added to the top priorities in 2007 and 
improving preparedness to natural disasters dropped to number 10 (NGA, 2007).  This 
addition could be attributed to the impacts experienced by Hurricane Katrina, which kept 
response to natural disasters high in the year following the disaster, and the focus shifted 
to citizen preparedness once the response issues had passed. Concerns about a pandemic 
influenza also fell to the number 12 priority after a significant decline in media coverage 
over the bird flu (NGA).  There is also a noticeable change in the importance given to 
state fusion centers. Relationships and operations were noted as improving, yet there is 




Figure 4.   Top Homeland Security Priorities 2007 (Taken from NGA, 2007) 
The most significant difference to be noted in the 2008 survey was the ranking of 
priorities (NGA, 2008).  More emphasis was given to coordination of state and local 
agencies, moving development of interoperable communications to the second priority.  
This is in part due to the improvement of state interoperable state communication 
structures and plans. The remaining priorities maintained a consistent level of importance 
to the survey respondents.  
 
Figure 5.   Top Homeland Security Priorities: 2008 (Taken from NGA, 2008) 
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The last survey completed was 2009 and repeated four priorities of previous years 
(NGA, 2009). The development of state fusion centers fell out of the top five and 
replaced by a need to improve preparedness through exercises (NGA).  However, the 
survey did state that the relationship between state and federal fusion centers “remains 
less than optimal” (NGA).  The governance of fusion centers is inconsistent and the long-
term strategies for sustainment have not been identified.  
 
Figure 6.   Top Homeland Security Priorities: 2009 (From NGA, 2009) 
Although more than 10 years has passed since the September 11, 2001 attacks in 
New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, the perception of priorities from state homeland 
security directors has undergone little change.  The overarching themes that have 
prevailed include state and local coordination, interoperable communications, intelligence 
and information sharing, critical infrastructure security, public health, and preparedness.  
While some of these themes have moved up and down the priority list, they have 
continued to be in the conversation since the creation of homeland security.   
Table 1.   Table Comparison of Priorities in Order of Priority for the Given Year 
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CIP Coordination CIP CIP CIP 
Intelligence CIP Intelligence Intelligence Citizen 
Preparedness 








   
B. GOVERNANCE AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES 
Homeland security responsibilities have been pushed upon state governments, and 
according to Steiner (n.d.), “state governments have been assigned the lead role.”  There 
is concurrence with this view from Morton (2008) who states that the “primary 
responsibility and authority for homeland security may have to devolve from the Federal 
to the state level.” Governors throughout the nation have responded, providing direction 
to meet these new heightened security requirements.  This direction has come in the form 
of executive orders, statute changes, and verbal authority.  Some states created new 
positions while others incorporated the additional responsibilities into existing 
departments.   
This dual tasking was not new.  States began to develop counter-terrorism plans in 
the 1990s.  In fact, a survey by CSG and NEMA (2002) found that “15 states had created 
some form of homeland security planning group before Sept. 11” although “most 
remained dormant” throughout this time period (Foster, 2002).  
The Council of State Governments provided a guide in 2002, State Officials 
Guide to Homeland Security, outlining what the critical issues surrounding homeland 
security are as it relates to state government (Foster, 2002).  The intention of the guide 
was to assist governors in making the necessary policy decisions with regards to 
homeland security. In the discussion regarding governance and organization, three 
questions were asked:  
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1. Does your state have the organizational structure in place to conduct 
vulnerability assessments, share intelligence and threat information, 
conduct multi-agency planning, and serve as a liaison with the Office of 
Homeland Security?  
2. Is your state conducting multi-agency planning to address homeland 
security on a united front?  
3. Does your states homeland security office, position or planning group 
have the authority to act appropriately ad serve in its required capacity? 
(Foster, 2002)  
As a part of this guide, CSG and NEMA (2002) conducted a survey to review 
each state’s organizational structure for homeland security. The results indicated that 19 
states created a new position to address homeland security issues (CSG, 2002). Similarly, 
some states initially created task forces to incorporate a multi-disciplinary approach to 
homeland security.  
The National Governor’s Association provided follow on direction with A 
Governor’s Guide to Homeland Security, initially published in 2007 and updated in 2010.  
NGA’s intention with this guide was to “provide governors with an overview of their 
homeland security roles and responsibilities” (2007). NGA asked the following questions 
in the 2010 update:   
1. How are the state’s homeland security functions and emergency 
management agencies coordinated?  
2. What is the role and authority of the governor’s homeland security 
advisor? 
3. Are state emergency response plans adequate to respond to the current 
threat environment?  
4. How is the state’s fusion center organized and what intelligence products 
does it produce?  
5. Are the state’s first responders’ communications sufficiently 
interoperable? (NGA, 2010) 
These questions vary slightly from the CSG in 2002 but have some similarities 
over the eight-year period, organization and collaboration as the resounding themes.  
Additionally, the Library of Congress produced a separate document in 2007, A Guide to 





the States and Territories of the United States, outlining the location and responsibilities 
of homeland security advisors within each state government as well as the authority 
under which it operates.  
In addition to the aforementioned guides, a series of reports and studies have been 
conducted to identify how states are organizing their efforts.  The Office of Homeland 
Security (2002) and the Council of State Governments (2002) published preliminary 
guidance evaluating state’s initial organizational structures developed to address 
homeland security concerns.  Subsequently, the Council of State Governments provided 
updates on the progression of state homeland security governance structures in the 2004, 
2005, and 2006 Book of States (Hughes, 2004; Sheets, 2005; Bell, 2006).  The National 
Governor’s Association’s Center for Best Practices conducted six annual surveys of State 
Homeland Security Directors (2005–2009),2 addressing governance and priorities.  
Finally, in 2010 the National Governor’s Association provided simply an overview of 
State Homeland Security Governance Structures, rather than a follow on survey from the 
previous six years.   
Each report or study depicted the results in different formats.  However, some 
common themes among them emerged, including what discipline provides the homeland 
security advisor role and whether a dual role is being served.  Based on this reporting, the 
majority of homeland security advisors are located in one of four different areas: military, 
emergency management, public safety, or the governor’s office. Beginning with the CSG 
report (2002) the majority of homeland security advisors were located in the public safety 
sector at 34 percent.  Public safety, in terms of these surveys, encompasses those agencies 
specifically designated as public safety or with a law enforcement mission, such as state 
patrol.  Public safety is followed equally by the Adjutant Generals office and the 
Governor’s Office at 26 percent and only 16 percent were located initially in the 
emergency management office (CSG, 2002).  The Book of States shows a decrease from 
the public safety sector in 2004 (Hughes) and 2005 (Sheets) to 30 percent and 18 percent 
                                                 
2 The 2006–2009 surveys are published on the NGA Website.  The 2005 results could not be located in 
a published format.  
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respectively but increases in 2006 (Bell) to 22 percent.  There is also a steady decline in 
the Adjutant Generals office from 22 percent in 2004 (Hughes) to 16 percent and 14 
percent in 2005 (Sheets) and 2006 (Bell).  There was a slight increase in the location of 
the emergency management office to 18 percent in 2004 (Hughes) and 2005 (Sheets) and 
to 20 percent in 2006 (Bell).  The greatest increase is seen in the governor’s office or 
special advisor with an initial drop to 10 percent in 2004 (Hughes), a slight increase in 
2005 (Sheets) to 14 percent, and a significant increase in 2006 (Bell) to 30 percent, 
slightly more than the original percentage in the 2002 (CSG) report.   
The National Governor’s Association (NGA) reports some very different numbers 
in the locations of the homeland security advisors (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009).  The 2006 
and 2009 surveys (NGA) did not delineate the location of the advisor but in 2007 public 
safety has the greatest distribution at 38 percent, quite a bit higher than the previous 
year’s report from the CSG (Bell, 2006).  This is followed by the Adjutant General, 
which showed a steady decline in the CSG surveys (Hughes, 2004; Sheets, 2005; Bell, 
2006) but is reported by NGA (2007) to be at 35 percent.  Emergency management 
offices only show 16 percent of the homeland security advisors and most surprisingly is 
the governor’s office that was the lowest at 11 percent (NGA, 2007).  This number is 
vastly different from the previous year’s CSG (Bell, 2006) report that had the governor’s 
office housing 30 percent of the homeland security advisors.  The NGA 2008 homeland 
director survey did not vary much from the previous year with the majority still in public 
safety at 40 percent, followed by the Adjutant General at 33 percent.  Emergency 
management and the governor’s office reversed roles with the governor’s office 
increasing to 20 percent and emergency management decreasing to 10 percent (NGA, 
2008).  
NGA produced an overview in 2010 that strictly looked at homeland security 
structures rather than a survey.  The data is significantly different from the previous 





increased significantly to 28 percent (NGA, 2010).  The governor’s office only accounted 
for 24 percent of the homeland security advisors and coming in last was the Adjutant 
Generals office at 16 percent (NGA, 2010).   
Additional themes identified in the various surveys include positions that report 
directly to the governor in a cabinet level position, independent cabinet positions or is it 
placed within a larger division.  CSG’s (2002) initial report did not delineate this 
breakdown but was seen in the 2004 (Hughes) and 2005 (Sheets) Book of States.  
According to CSG (2002), 70 percent of homeland security organizations were a division 
of a larger cabinet, 20 percent were an independent cabinet, and only 10 percent were 
part of an advisory group.  These numbers did not change to a great extent in 2005 
(Sheets) with the majority still being a division of a larger cabinet; however, it did drop to 
52 percent.  Independent cabinets increased to 34 percent and advisory groups increased 
slightly to 14 percent (Sheets, 2005).   
CSG did not provide this delineation in 2006, but in the NGA surveys beginning 
in 2006, this breakdown was outlined.  The distribution does not follow the CSG survey 
with only 28 percent as part of a larger division and 23 percent as an independent cabinet 
(NGA, 2006).  The number of advisory group structures was not reported.  In 2007, NGA 
reported similar numbers.  Larger cabinets comprised 27 percent and independent 
cabinets increased to 30 percent (NGA, 2007).  Advisory groups constituted 25 percent of 
the makeup and 18 percent were not accounted for (NGA, 2007).  NGA’s 2008 survey 
again shows little change with a slight increase in the division of larger cabinets to 30 
percent, a slight drop in the independent cabinet to 28 percent, and advisory groups 
remained the same.   
In 2009 (NGA), a significant difference is noted.  Organizations as part of a larger 
cabinet increased drastically to 51 percent with a slight drop in independent positions to 
20 percent and a more significant decrease in the advisory groups to only 13 percent 





in the division of a larger cabinet to 64 percent and a slight increase to 24 percent for 
independent cabinets.  Advisory groups were not accounted for in this report (NGA, 
2009).   
The 2009 NGA survey indicated states are beginning to align homeland security 
with another department such as public safety or emergency management, but it did not 
specify which was more prevalent. The four homeland security director’s surveys did not 
have 100 percent participation (NGA, 2006, 2007, 2008, & 2009).  The lowest response 
year was 2006 when only 70 percent reported and the highest in 2008 when 85 percent 
reported (NGA).  The 2007 and 2009 surveys had 80 percent and 84 percent respectively 
(NGA).  
The Book of States reported in 2004 that 19 states had recently reorganized their 
homeland security governance structures, seven were in the planning states of 
reorganizing and 25 had no plans to reorganize (Hughes).  The 2005 report identified 17 
as having just reorganized; however, it is unclear if this is 17 additional from the previous 
year or perhaps a reduction from the previous year (Sheets).  It showed the same number 
of states in the planning stages of reorganizing but did not mention how many had no 
plans to reorganize (Sheets).  It did add, however, that 15 states had combined homeland 
security functions with another agency, but it did not articulate which ones those were 




Homeland Security Governance  
Report CSG Book of States NGA State HS Director Survey NGA 
Year 2002 2004 2005 2006 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Dual Role   30%  29% 45% 34% 23% 52% 
Rep to Gov     46% 32% 46% 49% 14% 
 
Independent 
Cabinet  20% 34%  23% 30% 28% 20% 24% 
Div of larger 
cabinet  70% 52%  28% 27% 30% 51% 64% 
Advisory 
Group  10% 14%   25% 25% 13%  
 
TAG 26% 22% 16% 14%  35% 33%  16% 
Emer Mgt 16% 18% 18% 20%  16% 10%  28% 
Pub Safety 34% 30% 18% 22%  38% 40%  34% 
Gov Office 26% 10% 14% 30%  11% 20%  24% 
Figure 7.   Homeland Security Governance Structures3   
CSG also identified in 2005 that in 16 states emergency management and 
homeland security were separate departments with equal standing (Sheets).  The 2006 
Book of States report indicated that only four states had a combined role of emergency 
management and homeland security; however, it did not indicate whether or not there 
were combined roles of homeland security and public safety (Bell).   
Homeland security advisors are directed to plan and coordinate homeland security 
activities and advise the governor on the capacity to prevent and respond to terrorist 
incidents.  The functions involved in achieving this directive have overlap in their 
responsibilities.  The surveys examined demonstrate a continued change in governance 
                                                 
3 Each survey and report reviewed used different criteria for their reporting. The percentages listed are 
an interpretation of the figures presented to fall into the common themes identified.  Categories are not 
necessarily exclusive and may cross into other categories.  Therefore, results may or may not produce a 
definitive delineation of governance structures.  
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structures with a trend towards combining roles and fewer reporting directly to the 
governor.  The distribution of disciplines having responsibility over homeland security is 
varied.  The most consistent is public safety and has continuously been the primary 
discipline with the greatest number of states. It is time to come together as a nation and 
coalesce around a set of fundamental principles that encourage unity of effort in 
achieving our homeland security objectives.  
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
From a homeland security perspective, the attacks of September 11 caused states 
to re-address their current efforts for terrorism preparedness.  Many states already had 
some planning in place, most of which started after the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995 
and further enhanced after the first World Trade Center attack in 1993.  State 
governments, however, are uniquely different with independent constitutions and varying 
priorities.  Common themes identified among the literature, however, provide a starting 
point for developing the foundational principles that state government feels are critical 
for advancing homeland security capacity.  Conversely, many of the states’ homeland 
security efforts focus on strategy development are largely centered on implementing the 
target capability list and national planning scenarios in an effort to secure homeland 
security grant funding.  A systems approach, guided by doctrine, would focus strategy 
development on the states specific homeland security priorities as they relate to agree 
upon fundamental core capabilities needed for a more secure homeland.    
The organizational possibilities encompass the spectrum of state government.  
Subsequently, homeland security structures vary from state to state with only one 
commonality—each governor has a homeland security advisor in some capacity to 
coordinate the activities needed to implement a homeland security mission.  There is a 
common charge for these positions as demonstrated in the identified priorities among the 
surveys—to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist attacks.  The Department of Homeland 
Security attempts to provide tools to assist all levels of government in their efforts. The 
National Response Framework (DHS, 2008) provides guidance on how the nation will 
respond to a catastrophic event.  The National Incident Management System (DHS, 2008) 
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complements this and provides a management structure that provides the capacity for all 
levels of government along with non-governmental and private sector partners to work 
together towards a successful outcome.  These tools, however, are not a national model 
for governance. According to Morton (2008): 
The Federal government has not structured itself effectively and 
efficiently to resource and support state and local authorities to execute 
integrated, national (to include the private sector and NGO communities), 
all-hazards, homeland security prevention, protection/mitigation, response 
and recovery, consistent with the NRF/NIMS/ESF doctrinal basis for 
coordinated planning and execution.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Homeland security governance and organization was and continues to be unique 
to each state and its interpretation of what are the homeland security priorities necessary 
to protect its citizens.  The development of state homeland security doctrine must first 
align the fundamental priorities demonstrated across the nation.  Concurrence on the 
overarching themes that have prevailed, agreement on the federal and state roles, along 
with adherence to a common set of principles, will provide the necessary guidance and 





V. DRAWING CONCLUSIONS 
A. LINKAGES—MAKING THE CONNECTION 
Taking into consideration the definition of doctrine as defined for this thesis, a set 
of guiding principles that establish the foundation for the various strategies and policies 
of an organization, what are the linkages in guiding principles that translate to the 
fundamental pillars of homeland security doctrine?    
Military doctrine uses principles to build strategies and policies in accomplishing 
military missions. The Air Force has used doctrine to define who it is, grow the 
organization, and ultimately gain autonomy as a fundamental independent component of 
our defense structure. Through much discussion and debate, the Air Force successfully 
used doctrine to grow from the Army Signal Corps in 1907 to the USAF in 1947. The 
evolution civil defense demonstrates this same concept.  The Federal Civil Defense Act 
(FCDA) of 1950 provided the initial framework for protecting citizens and managing 
consequences of an attack.  State governments achieved agreement on fundamental 
principles for developing a civil defense program and organizational structure.  As the 
“all hazards” debate started to materialize, civil defense programs began to mature and 
become more inclusive. This growth of civil defense to the current homeland security 
structure parallels that of the Air Force.  A key difference, however, between the Air 
Force and homeland security is the use of doctrine to facilitate that growth.  
Conversely, homeland security is still lacking in an understanding of foundational 
principles, causing placement of the civil defense mission in 17 separate agencies from 
the creation of the Office of Civilian Defense in 1941 to the Department of Homeland 
Security in 2002. This is not to argue that the Air Force growth was without flaws, rather 
that identification and agreement of fundamental principles facilitated the development of 
the USAF.  Looking through the eyes of state government, this evolution is lacking 
doctrine and has left state and local governments as the primary problem solver with 
great uncertainty in how to implement the evolving homeland security mission.  
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Where the Air Force model is a roadmap of how to grow through doctrinal 
development, joint doctrine provides a model to bring different disciplines together, 
coalesce around independent views and create a level of interdependency.  Joint doctrine 
structures development around three guiding principles: unity of effort, centralized 
planning, and decentralized execution.  There is direct application of these principles to 
state homeland security governance.   
The FDCA charged the federal government with providing coordination, guidance 
and assistance to sustain preparedness efforts. This representation of unity of effort 
provides the platform for integration of organizational partners as suggested in joint 
doctrine.  Unity of effort at the state level must take this further and find the balance 
between applying federal guidance and supporting local government.  Additionally, states 
must recognize the attributes each state agency brings to the mission and help develop the 
program.  As demonstrated in the evaluation of governance structures, homeland security 
is spread across several disciplines. NFPA 1600 (2010) recognizes and articulates that the 
disaster community utilizing this standard is comprised from many different entities, with 
varied responsibilities and capabilities.  Embracing the strengths that each offer will help 
states integrate the necessary skills and coordinate the effort needed to successful.  
The lessons of centralized planning through joint doctrine provide a platform to 
incorporate a regional concept of planning.  As described in joint doctrine, centralized 
planning is the overarching guidance ensuring synchronization among the various 
partners.  The goal is to standardize terminology, establish relationships and define 
responsibilities.  A level of centralized planning exists for state government.  Current 
disaster planning uses several documents in the effort to achieve centralized planning. 
The Community Preparedness Guide 101 (CPG 101) (FEMA, 2010a) sets forth the 
fundamentals of emergency planning in an effort to assist state and local governments 
develop integrated, coordinated, and synchronized plans. This is further validated through 
the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP), a formal process to 
accredit an organization around the centralized concepts found in the NFPA 1600 
(NFPA, 2010). This level of centralized planning creates opportunity to maximize the 
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strengths and accommodate the weaknesses of those jurisdictions that the state is there to 
support.  The missing link in this centralized planning is the haphazard inclusion of 
homeland security.   
Decentralized execution then reinforces the concept that all disasters are local. 
The first principle of the proposed civil defense program was giving the primary 
operating responsibility for civil defense to state and local governments. The initial 
guidance from the Office of Civil Defense was not intended to be prescriptive or all-
inclusive.  Joint doctrine provides the same understanding that doctrine is intended to 
authoritative but not prescriptive.  As doctrine guides the development of strategy and 
policy, execution will and must happen at the local level with support from the state. As 
stated in joint doctrine (JCS, 2007), decentralization allows operational command and 
control to happen at the local level, making the detailed decisions necessary for 
successful implementation of doctrine. The absence of a similar homeland security 
guidance document limits decision maker’s ability to shape the structure of homeland 
security and implement programs to meet the current threats we face. States can take a 
proactive role and learn from the military model to define the fundamental pillars of 
homeland security and develop an agreed upon doctrine and guidance into the future.  
B. EMBRACING DOCTRINE AND THE END STATE 
Governors provide strategic direction to their homeland security directors and 
advisors.  The governance architecture is comprised of many different disciplines and 
levels of government.  States must work downward to include local jurisdictions, which 
in and of themselves have a variety of disciplines to integrate.  They must also work 
upward to comply with federal guidance and directives.  In this sense, state governments 
must find the appropriate level of inclusion to solidify the many disciplines into a 
progressive step forward. This process must begin by identifying what role states play in 
homeland security, formulating the fundamental principles guiding homeland security, 
and enabling states to develop a homeland security program effectively interacts with 
their federal and local partners.  
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Several overarching themes emerged from a series of surveys conducted of 
homeland security directors by the Council of State Governments and National 
Governors Association.  The common themes include state and local coordination, 
intelligence and information sharing, critical infrastructure protection, public health, and 
preparedness. These themes are the starting point for establishing the fundamental 
principles that all states must address and incorporate into a national homeland security 
doctrine.   
If the themes above are the key ingredients for doctrine, how are they related to 
the four pillars identified from the military model? The first pillar was developing a 
foundation articulate the history and evolution of homeland security.  If one agrees that 
the roots of homeland security lie with the birth of civil defense, the progression will 
provide an understanding of where homeland security has come from and also provide 
the platform for states to build upon. The key ingredients are not the basis for this part of 
doctrine, rather the historical perspective that has led to the current priorities identified by 
homeland security directors.  History is not the only component of this pillar, values, and 
culture must be incorporated from various disciplines and integrated into a synchronous 
overarching framework.  
Direction and guidance encompasses joint doctrines themes of unity of effort, 
centralized planning, and decentralized execution.  Joint doctrine has had its trial and 
error, and homeland security is no exception.  Unity of effort reflects the priority of state 
and local coordination.  Without recognition of the interdependencies of the multi-
disciplinary aspect of homeland security, a comprehensive approach, as described in 
unity of effort, will not be possible.  Intelligence and information sharing is reflected in 
unity of effort as well.  This critical component is attributed to be one of the most 
significant failures of the September 11, 2001 attacks.  The beginning of joint doctrine, 
and subsequently homeland security doctrine, therefore, is the unity of effort concept and 
bringing in partners from many different disciplines. This provides a mechanism to 
coordinate and collaborate and the necessary synergy needed for centralized planning.    
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Preparedness is the key ingredient demonstrated by centralized planning. This 
priority includes first responder and citizen preparedness.  Joint doctrine calls for 
simplicity and clarity.  It also recognizes that each discipline brings unique capabilities to 
the planning table, further necessitating the need for centralized planning.  Without 
recognition of complementary capabilities, preparedness efforts will be duplicative, 
which will create inefficiencies or worse, fail to identify a critical area needed for 
preparedness, resulting in catastrophic failures.  
Successful application of the first two components sets the stage for the final one, 
decentralized execution.  Critical infrastructure protection and public health both fall 
under this last component.  The protection of jurisdictions’ critical infrastructure is 
specific to them; therefore, for effective protection, the local jurisdictions must take the 
lead.  They receive support from the state in terms of funding through grants and 
assistance in identifying all critical facilities through technical assistance.   
The third pillar provides the organizational architecture.  Doctrine provides the 
medium to articulate the best ways to organize around common functions and core 
capabilities, taking lessons from history and applying to the current environment. The key 
ingredients, reflected from the homeland security directors’ survey, provide the common 
priorities all states agree are part of their homeland security mission.  However, the 
organizational structures do not necessarily reflect these same priorities.  The guiding 
view for state homeland security structures focuses on which departments within existing 
governance should host homeland security.  Where joint doctrine outlines how each 
agency contributes to the overall architecture, the lack of homeland security doctrine fails 
to incorporate the unity of effort needed to effectively coordinate efforts and apply sound 
organizational principles to address the key ingredients that are of concern to governors. 
An understanding and acceptance of this concept is critical for homeland security 
doctrine to be beneficial.   
Unity of effort, along with state and local coordination, is intertwined with the 
fourth pillar of doctrine—establishing relationships. The relationships between the state 
and local jurisdictions and the state and federal agencies are inhibited by the boundaries 
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created from a lack of doctrine.  Defining how we work in an interagency environment is 
complex and sometimes contentious as we strive to understand the issues involved in 
homeland security relationships and attempt to define responsibilities clearly.  The ability 
to establish and understand how relationships complement each other makes possible the 
other key ingredients.   
As a result, the end state for homeland security doctrine begins with assimilation 
of the key ingredients identified by homeland security directors into the four foundational 
pillars of military doctrine.  Incorporating the identified concepts and strengths of 
existing programs expands on past principles, rather than try to create new ones. 
Additionally, it provides a method to reflect on founding principles. This modeling 
process creates a positive step forward to define what the homeland security doctrine 
should look like.  
C. SETTING EXPECTATIONS—DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT   
To begin this doctrinal development, several steps are necessary.  First, we need 
to learn from the military model. The military has a proven methodology for doctrinal 
development and implementation through strategy and policy.  The identification of the 
key ingredients of the military process and the application of these recognized practices 
will be the starting point for an accepted homeland security doctrine. 
Second, one doctrine should serve to unify principles and priorities for the states, 
providing a comprehensive and integrated approach to homeland security.  The 
leveraging of existing programs will begin to define the structure, creating a system and 
process that will allow the states to organize around the foundation that they set forth in 
the subsequent strategy. The success of homeland security for states will be dependent 
upon the achievement of its components as a whole. 
Finally, if homeland security is to be taken seriously, it must be institutionalized.  
Doctrine provides the foundation and framework to articulate a common set of core 
values and guiding principles that crosscuts all departments and achieves a unity of effort 
in the quest for a more secure homeland.  
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D. APPLICATION—PROPOSED NATIONAL HOMELAND SECURITY 
DOCTRINE MODEL 
A proposed model for a national homeland security doctrine is presented (see 
Appendix), based on the findings of this research, to aid in institutionalizing a sound 
homeland security program.  It is intended to be a starting point for state governments to 
come together and expand.  Commonalities recognized throughout the research are 
provided as recommendations to aid in development of doctrine.  It recognizes that, if 
implemented, individual states may request modifications to the doctrinal model in an 
effort to meet their individual needs.  However, the guidance is that states develop 
strategies, based on the fundamentals outlined here, and adapt such strategy to 
incorporate their specific requirements.  
E. FINAL THOUGHTS 
The future holds the potential for even greater threat with the continued use of 
terrorism around the world. A comprehensive, deliberate homeland security doctrine is 
necessary for states to be more effective, building and sustaining the necessary 
partnerships, establishing the parameters for those things needed in the overall homeland 
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APPENDIX. NATIONAL HOMELAND SECURITY DOCTRINE 
MODEL 
Chapter 1: Foundation 
A. History  
Understanding the historical components that have led to the current state of 
homeland security provides the foundation from which to build.  It should begin with the 
formation of civil defense and continue with the evolution to emergency management.  
This transition is significant to our current state of homeland security.  Several 
significant events contributed to this process.  They are included for context and provide 
an overall understanding of the homeland security environment.   
a. Civil defense 
b. Emergency management 
c. Significant events 
d. The homeland security environment 
B. Values and Ethos 
a. Ethos  
The culture of homeland security is comprised of the cultures of several 
disciplines.  This section provides an opportunity to discuss what common cultural 
aspects exist and promote the success of the homeland security mission.  
b. Core Values  
The following core values come from the Homeland Security Council (2007) 
National Strategy for Homeland Security.  It is a point of departure to develop what the 
core values as related to homeland security are for state governments.  
i. Integrity. “Service before self” 
ii. Vigilance. “Guarding America” 





C. Guiding Principles  
The following guiding principles taken from The Principles of Emergency 
Management (Principles, 2007), are also common themes discussed throughout the 
homeland security literature.  A definition of their influence on state homeland security 
provides the main beliefs for a successful homeland security mission.   
a. Comprehensive  
b. Progressive  
c. Risk-driven  
d. Integrated  
e. Collaborative  
f. Coordinated  
g. Flexible 
h. Professional 
D. Strategy and Policy Relationship  
With so many strategies related to homeland security, it must be understood how 
they interrelate.  This section should describe how doctrine would guide strategy 
development to meet the unique needs for each state.  
a. Policy and strategy defined 
b. Relationship with homeland security strategy 
c. Relationship with other federal strategy 
d. Strategy development 
Chapter 2: Direction and Guidance  
The way forward for homeland security requires direction.  This section is 
attempted to be covered in the several guides produced to assist governors with their 
homeland security missions.  Bringing leadership together on this guidance will help 
institutionalize homeland security.    
A. National guidance 
B. Unity of effort 
C. Centralized planning and decentralized execution 
D. Risk assessment 
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Chapter 3: Organization  
A. Organizational Components  
As demonstrated in the many surveys, organization is varied and haphazard.  
Much restructuring has occurred over the past decade leaving opportunity for gaps and 
inconsistencies.  Defining what organizational components have a homeland security 
role and how they fit into the overall organization provides the starting point in a 
comprehensive governance structure.  
a. Director / Advisor  
b. Define  the organization 
c. Advisory council 
d. Legal counsel 
B. Core Capabilities  
The following priorities were identified throughout homeland security 
organizations nationally.  They are correlated here as the core capabilities 
required to implement a homeland security mission. 
a. Infrastructure protection 




d. Coordination and collaboration 
e. Intelligence/information sharing 
f. Interoperable communications 
C. Functions 
These four functions are not agreed upon nationally.  The purpose of doctrine is 
to formulate what the fundamental functions of homeland security consist of.  This section 
will require a deliberate discussion to identify what responsibilities belong to homeland 
security.  
a. Prevention/mitigation,  




d. Recovery  
Chapter 4: Relationships  
Homeland security is a complex web of disciplines and levels of government.  
These relationships must be clearly stated and understood in order for a cohesive 
collaboration between all homeland security partners.  
A. State responsibilities  
B. Relationships between federal and local partners 
C. Private sector and non-governmental organizations 
D. Command and control relationships and responsibilities 
Chapter 5:  Future Considerations  
Doctrine can change, and the current threat environment is one reason.  The 
continuing shift in doctrinal thinking revolves around the reactive nature of our society.  
This chapter guides our natural response to significant events and provides opportunity 
to maximize on existing fundamental principles.   
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